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Abstract:  This paper investigates whether expectations of trustworthiness and 
resulting acts of trust accord with an objective model of trustworthiness or are biased. 
Combining experimental and survey data, I find that Ghanaian workers appropriately 
take account of the religiousness of trustees, but expect those with more children to be 
less as opposed to more trustworthy, and females to be less and the associationally 
active to be more trustworthy when they are neither. Trustors do not account for the 
negative impact on trustworthiness of various recent negative experiences and the 
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In trusting we render ourselves vulnerable. If our trust is well placed, i.e., if the object 
of our trust is worthy, it reaps positive returns. But if our trust is poorly placed it leads 
to losses. Whether trust is well or poorly placed depends in large part on the accuracy 
of the expectations upon which it is based. And how accurate an individual￿s 
expectations are depends on the amount and quality of the information they have and 
on how they process that information. Ceteris paribus, any bias in the way in which 
individuals construct and process their information sets, any ill founded beliefs about 
whether and how particular elements in their information set predict trustworthiness, 
will result in greater vulnerability and a higher probability of loss or in missed 
opportunities for positive return. 
 
Recent experimental studies indicate that expectations of trustworthiness do indeed 
affect trustors￿ behaviour (Ashraf et al., 2004; Barr, 2003; Burns, 2004) and some 
have identified biases. Table 1 provides information on trustees￿ characteristics that 
have been found to impact on trustors￿ behaviour and whether there is evidence of 
those characteristics also affecting trustworthiness. It shows that Burns (2004), for 
example, found that in South Africa black school children are trusted less than white 
and coloured school children even though they are no less trustworthy, while 
Ferstman and Gneezy (2001, 2002) found that Eastern Jews relative to Ashkenazic 
Jews are trusted less despite no evidence that they are less trustworthy. 
 
However, the way in which the subjects in these and other experiments receive the 
information upon which they base their decisions is considerably different to the way 
in which individuals acquire information about the people with whom they interact in  3
daily life. The information sets are presented to the subjects just prior to them making 
their decision rather than being acquired over possibly quite extended periods of time. 
And they are acquired through the viewing of photos (Burns, 2004; DeBruine, 2002; 
Eckle and Wilson, 2003; Scharleman et al., 2001), the reading of names, affiliations, 
and brief descriptions (Bouckaert and Dhaene, 2003; Eckel and Wilson, 2003, 
Ferstman and Gneezy, 2001, 2002; Haile et al., 2004; Holm, 2000), or very brief face-
to-face meetings (Glaeser et al., 2000; Lazzarini et al., 2004) rather than through a 
variety of means including conversations and opportunities to observe. Further, in the 
experiments, the information sets are strictly limited to include data on the 
characteristics to which the hypothesised biases pertain and just enough other data to 
act as a camouflage. 
 
These protocols ensure a high degree of control as the experimentalists can observe 
and, so, take account of all the information presented to the subjects. They are ideally 
suited to providing answers to questions of the form ￿When presented with limited 
information set, X,  about a potential trustee, does a trustor condition his or her 
decision on x0X?￿ ￿And if he or she does so, is it rational, in the sense that x predicts 
trustworthiness?￿ However, by limiting the information set and controlling the way in 
which it is acquired, the experimenters may be promoting the salience of certain 
characteristics. And this being the case, the approach is not well suited to providing 
answers to open and potentially more interesting questions such as ￿Upon what 
information do potential trustors condition their decisions?￿ and ￿In so doing, are they 
being rational or biased?￿ 
  4
Here, I endeavour to address these open questions by involving groups of individuals 
who have known and interacted with one another for some time in a trust experiment. 
The groups of individuals are colleagues sampled from 22 Ghanaian manufacturing 
enterprises. Barr and Serneels (2004) show that within these enterprises greater 
trustworthiness among colleagues leads to higher earnings and productivity. Given 
this real return on trustworthiness, it is reasonable to assume that colleagues will have 
made efforts to provide and collect information on characteristics that signal each 
others￿ trustworthiness. The objective of this analysis is to establish what these 
characteristics are and whether they are appropriately taken into account by trustors. I 
do this by combining experimental and survey data. 
 
The paper has 4 sections. Following this brief introduction, in section 2, I outline my 
experimental, survey, and analytical methodology. I present the results in section 3 






2.1 Experimental  design 
The experiment involved the Investment Game designed by Berg, Dickhaut and 
McCabe (1995). The game has two players. At the start of the game both players 
receive an equal initial cash endowment, y.
2 The first player decides how much of her 
                                                 
2 The initial cash endowment, y, was set at Cedi 20,000, just less than twice the mean daily earnings for 
the sampled employees and apprentices. Play was conducted using Cedi 5,000 notes. The exchange rate 
prevailing at the time of the fieldwork was Cedi 7,649 to the US dollar.  5
cash, s < y, to pass to the second player. The amount she passes is tripled by the 
experimenter, and then given to the second player. The second player then decides 
how much to pass back, r < 3s, to the first player. So, the first player￿s final payoff is 
y-s+r  and the second player￿s final payoff is y+3s-r. Under the classical assumptions 
of selfish money maximization the second player returns nothing and, expecting this, 
the first player sends nothing.  
 
The experiment involved 424 employees and apprentices randomly drawn from 22 
Ghanaian manufacturing enterprises distributed across two cities, the capital, Accra, 
and the inland city of Kumasi. The total number of employees and apprentices 
sampled from each enterprise ranged from 8 to 46. 
 
The games were played after work hours in schools near to the employees￿ places of 
work. Two classrooms and a corridor were used in every case. The employees were 
taught the game while sitting at amply spaced desks in one of the classrooms. Then 
they were called one at a time to interviews with a research assistant sitting at a desk 
in the corridor. In these interviews they were taught the game once more, were 
verbally tested on their understanding of the game, and then played. Finally, they 
were directed to wait in the second classroom until everyone had played and they 
could receive their payoffs. Both the description of the game presented in the first 
classroom and the one-to-one interviews were scripted. The scripts were written in 
English, translated into Twi, a Ghanaian language spoken by all of the employees and 
apprentices in our sample, piloted and adjusted, and then back translated by an 
uninformed translator to check that intended meanings had not changed. The scripts 
were adhered to at all times. If subjects asked questions, the relevant part of the script  6
was repeated. The researcher and a monitor were posted in the first classroom to 
prevent the waiting employees talking after learning the game but prior to making 
their decisions. Both roles and pairs were randomly assigned. The first players (the 
trustors) were interviewed in random order and then the second players (the trustees) 
were interviewed, again in random order. Each first player was informed that they 
were playing with one of their colleagues who were still waiting in the room they had 
just exited. Second players were simply informed that they were playing with a 
colleague. None of the players knew the exact identity of their playing partner. 
 
In the analysis that follows, the jth first player￿s trust is captured by the amount they 
sent to the second player expressed as a proportion of their initial stake,  y s j / . The 
ith second players￿ trustworthiness is captured by the amount they returned to the first 
player expressed as a proportion of the amount received from that first player,  i i s r / . 
 
2.2  Survey 
The survey data was collected from the employees and apprentices who participated 
in the experiments during one-to-one interviews with Twi-speaking research 
assistants conducted a day or so prior to the experimental workshops. The interviews 
followed a structured questionnaire designed to elicit data on a wide range of 
respondent￿s characteristics including, wherever feasible given the context, those 
indicated by the literature. Table 2 contains a list of the variables that have been found 
to be significant determinants of trust in previous studies. Topics covered in the 
Ghanaian interviews included earnings from various activities, employment, ethnicity, 
religion, civil social activity, recent social experiences, family background, and 
childhood experiences.  7
2.3 Analytical  approach 
The analytical approach is based on the notion of backward induction. First, I identify 
the determinants of trustworthiness. Then, I establish whether the trustors￿ behaviour 
is appropriately conditioned on the incidence of these determinants among their 
potential trustees or inappropriately conditioned on these and other characteristics. 
 
To find out which of the trustees￿ personal characteristics determine, predict, or signal 
their trustworthiness I estimate a trustworthiness function of the form 
i i i i X R s r 1 1 ) ( / ε + =         ( 1 )  
where  i X1  is the vector of personal characteristics that signal trustworthiness and  i 1 ε  
is assumed to be an i.i.d. normal error term. Linearity is assumed during estimation. 
 
Then, I turn to the analysis of trusting behaviour. I assume that a trustor￿s willingness 
to trust depends on a sub-set of their own characteristics and their expectations of 
their potential trustees￿ trustworthiness. So, 
   j i i j j j s r Exp Z T y s 1 ]) / [ , ( / ε + =       ( 2 )  
where  j Z  is the vector of own personal characteristics that affect trustors￿ willingness 
to trust,  ] / [ i i j s r Exp  is the jth trustor￿s expectation, including biases, and  j 1 ε  is an 
error term. 
 
If trustor￿s expectations are unbiased,  
j j i i i i j s r Exp s r Exp 2 ]) / [ ( ] / [ ε + =                   (3a) 
  j j i X R Exp 2 1 )]) ( [ ( ε + =                   (3b)  8
where the subscript j on  j i i s r Exp ]) / [ (  and  j i X R Exp )]) ( [ ( 1  serves to remind us that 
each trustor has a distinct set of potential trustees, and  i 2 ε  is an error term. If their 
expectations are biased, 
i j ij i i i j C X B Exp s r Exp 3 2 )]) , ( [ ( ) / ( ε + =                 (3c) 
where the expectation formation process is assumed to be common to all trustors,  i X 2  
is the vector of trustees￿ characteristics upon which the trustors condition their 
decisions,  ij C  is a vector of variables capturing coincidences in identity between the 
trustors and their potential trustees, and  i 3 ε  is an error term.  i X 2  may or may not 
equal  i X1 .  ij C , the significance of which will indicate biases in favour of or against 
insiders relative to outsiders, may or may not be empty. And, if  i i X X 1 2 =  and  ij C  is 
empty, bias is implied by  (.) (.) R B ≠ . 
 
Substituting for  ] / [ i i j s r Exp  in equation 2 using equations 3a, 3b and 3c generates 3 
trust functions each of which can be estimated by combining the experimental and 
survey data. The ideal proxy for  j i i s r Exp ]) / [ (  is the average  i i s r /  for each trustors￿ 
set of potential trustees. However, we do not have values for  i i s r /  for all potential 
trustees: all but the last trustor to play in each session would have numbered among 
their potential trustees some colleagues who were first rather than second players in 
the game. To combat this problem, while bearing in mind that the order in which the 
colleagues played was random, I estimate the function 
j j i i j j s r Exp Z T y s 4 ) ]) / [ ( , ( / ε + =       ( 4 )  
while weighting each observation according to the proportion of the trustors￿ potential 
trustees that actually took the role of trustee in the game and assuming that the error  9
term  j 4 ε  is i.i.d. normal under this regime. Linearity is assumed during estimation. 
Here, a positive and significant estimated coefficient on  j i i s r Exp ]) / [ (  suggests that, 
to some extent, trustors are effectively predicting trustworthiness within the context of 
the game and conditioning their behaviour accordingly. 
 
The ideal proxy for  j i X R Exp )]) ( [ ( 1  is the average predicted trustworthiness of each 
trustors￿ set of potential trustees, where the predictions are derived using the 
estimation of equation 1. A prediction can be made for all potential trustees. Then the 
average predicted trustworthiness relating to each trustor￿s set of potential trustees can 
be calculated and these averages can be used to estimate the function 
j j i j j X R Exp Z T y s 5 1 ) )]) ( [ ( , ( / ε + =       ( 5 )  
where the error term  j 5 ε  is assumed to be i.i.d. normal. Linearity is assumed during 
estimation. Here, a positive and significant coefficient on  j i X R Exp )]) ( [ ( 1  suggests 
that the trustors￿ model of trustworthiness is similar to the estimation of equation 1 
and that they are conditioning their behaviour accordingly. 
 
If equation 3c is substituted back into equation 2 and linearity is assumed, we arrive at 
a function of the form 
   j ij ij j j C X Z F y s 6 2 ) , , ( / ε + =        ( 6 )  
where the vector  ij X 2  contains the means of the elements in  i X 2  for the jth trustors￿ 
set of potential trustees, the vector  ij C  contains the means of the elements in  ij C , and 
j 6 ε  is assumed to be i.i.d. normal. Again assuming linearity, if  ij X 2  and  i X1  contain 
corresponding elements, a comparison of the coefficients on those elements in  10
equations 1 and 6 will serve as a first indication of the nature of any biases relating to 
the corresponding trustees￿ characteristics. Biases will also be indicated by the sign 
and significance of any non-corresponding elements in these vectors: some elements 
in  i X1  may not be matched by a corresponding element in  ij X 2  and vice-versa. And 
significant coefficients on any elements in  ij C  will indicate insider-outsider biases. 
 
Especially if  j i X R Exp )]) ( [ ( 1  is significant in the estimation of equation 5, 
reintroducing it into equation 6 to give 
   j j i ij ij j j X R Exp C X Z F y s 7 1 2 )]) ( [ ( ) , , ( / ε + + =                (7) 
where  j 7 ε  is assumed to be i.i.d. normal, may render the coefficients on the elements 
of  ij X 2  and  ij C  more informative about the nature of the biases. However, 
multicollinearity could severely constrain the usefulness of this approach. 
 
Determinants of trustworthiness that are neither observable to the trustors nor 
captured by the survey, pose a potential problem. If they are correlated with variables 
that are captured, the coefficients on the latter will be subject to omitted variable bias. 
However, the biases will be similar throughout the analysis. The same problem 
applies if there are determinants of trustworthiness that are appropriately taken into 
account by the trustors, are not captured during the survey, and are correlated with 
characteristics that do enter into the analysis. If there are trustees￿ characteristics that 
are not determinants of trustworthiness, are not captured by the survey, but do affect 
trustors￿ decisions and are correlated with variables that are captured, these will bias 
the coefficients on the latter in equations 6 and 7. As a result, caution must be applied  11
when drawing conclusions about the precise nature of the characteristics that act as 





3.1 Descriptive  statistics 
A histogram of amounts sent by the 212 first players is presented in Figure 1. Only 15 
percent of the first players sent nothing. Nearly 40 percent of the players sent half of 
their original stake and over ten percent sent the entire stake. 
 
The distribution of proportions returned by the 180 second players who received some 
positive amount from their playing partner is presented in Figure 2. In this case, less 
than two percent of the players behaved in a manner consistent with the classical 
assumptions by returning nothing. Over 35 percent returned double the amount sent, 
thereby ensuring equal final payoffs for themselves and their playing partners. Just 
under 30 percent returned the amount sent leaving their playing partner with a final 
payoff equal to their initial stake, while keeping the full return on the trusting act for 
themselves. Most of the remainder (just under 25 percent) returned an amount in 
between these two modes, thereby providing their playing partners with a positive 
return on their trusting acts, while securing a higher final payoff for themselves. 
 
Table 3 contains definitions, sample means, proportions, and, in the case of 
continuous variables, standard deviations for various characteristics of the first 
players in the experiment and the 180 second players who received a positive amount  12
from their playing partner.
3 22 percent of the players are female. Their mean age is 
just under 30 years and, on average, they have 10 years of formal education. 36 
percent are married and the average player has 1.15 children. Their mean total 
monthly earnings from all sources are Cedi 286,000 (just over US$37) per month. The 
large majority of these earnings derive from their work in the manufacturing 
enterprises from which they were sampled for this study. On average, the players have 
been working in these enterprises for over 5 years with only 12 percent holding part 
time positions. Nearly 10 percent have experienced a period of unemployment within 
the last 5 years and nearly 40 percent took time off work due to ill health during the 
preceding 12 months.  
 
Reflecting the regional focus of the study, the Asante and Fante, both Akan groups, 
dominate the sample (36 and 22 percent respectively) with other Akan groups 
accounting for a large proportion of the remainder (14 percent). These groups are 
particularly dominant in Kumasi, the capital of the Asante kingdom, from whence 50 
percent of the sample is drawn. The Ga and Adangbe, who are specifically indigenous 
to the Accra area, account for only 14 percent of the sample reflecting the tendency 
for members of these groups to focus on activities other than manufacturing. The 
Ewe, from the Volta region, account for around 10 percent of the sample. And 
migrants from the north account for less than 5 percent of the sample. Nearly 50 
percent of the players are indigenous to the area in which they live and work.  
 
37 percent of the players are Protestant, 11.5 percent are Catholic, 43 percent belong 
to other Christian denominations, mainly new charismatic churches specific to Ghana, 
                                                 
3 Eight questionnaires relating to first players were lost prior to data entry.  13
and 5.5 percent are Muslim. Levels of religious activity are high: the average 
frequency of engagement in an act of worship being nearly 15 times per month. This 
figure is strongly influenced by the few Muslims in the sample, who pray several 
times a day. However, many of the Christians attend church 3 or more times a week. 
Involvement in civil social activities is also considerable: the average player reported 
3 hours of formal associational activity and 1 additional hour of voluntary work per 
month. Finally, the average player recalls being let down by a friend 0.5 times during 
the last 12 months.
4 
 
Table 3 also presents the means and standard deviations for  j i i s r Exp ]) / [ (  and 
j i X R Exp )]) ( [ ( 1  across the 204 trustors. According to the former, the expected return 
to an average trustor, based on the actual behaviour of the trustees from their place of 
work, is 1.482 times the amount they sent. According to the latter, the expected return 
to an average trustor, based on the predicted (using the model in column 2 of Table 2) 
behaviour of all their potential trustees is 1.496 times the amount they sent. 
 
Table 3 contains the means across all trustors of 15 means and proportions relating to 
their unique sets of potential trustees. As expected, these closely reflect the 
                                                 
4  The following additional variables were incorporated into early runs of the analysis but never 
significantly improved the fit of the estimated models: the players￿ number of siblings, where they fell 
among their siblings in terms of birth order, their mothers￿ and fathers￿ education, whether they lived 
with people other than their parents of a significant part of their childhood, whether they recall being 
let down as a child, whether they recalled being happy as a child, whether any of their relatives died in 
the preceding 12 months, whether they are related to or from the same ethnic group as their employer, 
how many of their colleagues are relatives or from the same ethnic group, whether they are a recent 
migrant into the city, whether they were rural or urban born, whether they feel safe where they sleep at 
night, whether they sleep in their place of work, whether they think the neighbourhood in which they 
live is safe, whether they are a household head, with how many people they habitually share their 
meals, the number of times per week they go to a market to buy, the number of times per week they go 
to a market to sell, their ownership of an assortment of durable items, whether they belong to a labour 
union, their occupation, and the number of jobs they hold. 
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corresponding means and proportions described above. However, note that there is 
considerable variation across trustors. And finally, Table 3 presents the means across 
all trustors of three variables capturing coincidences in identity between themselves 
and their potential trustees. 48 percent of the average trustor￿s potential trustees are 
from the trustor￿s own ethnic group. 38 percent are from the trustor￿s own religion, 
and 82 percent are of the same sex. Again, there is considerable variation in these 
proportions across trustors. 
 
3.2 Regression  analyses 
Table 4 contains the analysis of trustworthiness. Two estimations of equation 1 are 
presented each taking  i i s r /  as the dependent variable. Both are estimated using 
ordinary least squares (OLS) with errors corrected for any heteroscedasiticity relating 
to the right-hand side variables and workplace. The regression in the first column 
contains 16 explanatory variables, although only nine have significant coefficients. 
The second regression includes eight out of these nine explanatory variables; the 
marital status of the player looses significance as variables are dropped from the 
model. The number of children a trustee has was not significant in the general model 
but became strongly significant once the age and married variables were removed. 
Dummy variables identifying the enterprises from which the players came, the city in 
which they are located, their religion, or their ethnicity did not significantly add to the 
performance of the model. According to the preferred parsimonious model players 
with more children, who are indigenous to the place in which they are living and 
working, who more frequently attend acts of worship, and/or who spend more of their 
time engaging in voluntary work are more trustworthy in the sense that they return a 
larger proportion of the amount entrusted to them within the context of the game.  15
Part-time employees, those who have experienced a period of unemployment during 
the past 5 years, those who have had to take time off work due to ill health during the 
past year, and/or those who have been let down by friends more often during the past 
year are less trustworthy in the sense that they return a smaller proportion of the 
amount entrusted to them within the context of the game. Finally, ceteris paribus, 
apparent trustworthiness declines as the number of subjects in the session and hence 
their sense of anonymity increases. 
 
Table 5 presents the initial stages of the analysis of trust. The regressions take  y s j /  
as the dependent variable. The regressions in the first and second columns take only 
the trustors￿ characteristics as explanatory variables and are estimated using OLS with 
errors corrected for heteroscedasticity as before. The first contains 16 explanatory 
variables, although only four have significant coefficients. The second includes only 
those four explanatory variables. Dummy variables identifying the enterprises from 
which the players came, the city in which they were located, their religion, or their 
ethnicity did not significantly add to the performance of the model. According to the 
more parsimonious model (second column) more educated and higher earning players 
are more trusting in the sense that they send a greater proportion of their original 
endowment to second players within the context of the game, while female players 
and those who spend more time engaged in voluntary work are less trusting. 
 
The third and fourth columns of Table 5 contain estimations of equations 4 and 5 
respectively. The regression in the third column includes the 4 significant trustors￿ 
characteristics and the proxy for  j i i s r Exp ]) / [ ( , the mean actual trustworthiness of 
each trustor￿s colleagues who played as trustees. This equation is estimated using  16
weighted least squares (WLS), where the weights for each observation relate to the 
proportion of the trustor￿s potential trustees that actually revealed their 
trustworthiness by assuming the role of trustee in the game, and errors are corrected 
for heteroscedasticity as before. The coefficient on  j i i s r Exp ]) / [ (  is positive but 
insignificant. The regression in the fourth column includes the four significant 
trustors￿ characteristics and the proxy for  j i X R Exp )]) ( [ ( 1 , the mean predicted 
trustworthiness of the trustors￿ potential trustees derived using the regression 
presented in the second column of Table 4, and is estimated using OLS with errors 
corrected for heteroscedasticity as before. The coefficient on mean  j i X R Exp )]) ( [ ( 1  is 
positive but insignificant, suggesting that the trustors￿ model of trustworthiness differs 
from the one presented in the second column of Table 4. 
 
Table 6 presents two estimations of equation 6 and one estimation of equation 7. In 
every case,  y s j /  is the dependent variable and the estimations are OLS with errors 
corrected for heteroscedasticity as before. To facilitate comparison, the parsimonious 
model of trust containing only trustors￿ characteristics is also presented in the first 
column (repeated from the second column of Table 4). In the second column 18 
means and proportions relating to the trustees are included. The first eight of these 
relate to characteristics that were found to be predictors of trustworthiness. The next 
seven were found not to predict trustworthiness. And the final three capture 
coincidences in the identity of the trustors and their trustees. Three out of the first set 
of means and proportions, two out of the second set, and none of the coincidence in 
identity variables are significant. If the insignificant means and proportions and 
coincidence variables are excluded, along with mean involvement in voluntary work  17
which becomes insignificant when other variables are dropped, we arrive at the model 
presented in the third column. Here, in accordance with the estimated model of 
trustworthiness, as the potential trustees￿ frequency of religious attendance increases, 
trust increases. However, that trust declines as the potential trustees￿ average number 
of children increases does not accord with the estimated model of trustworthiness. 
Also not in accordance with the estimated model of trustworthiness, as the proportion 
of women among the potential trustees increases, trust declines and as the potential 
trustees￿ average involvement in associational activity increases, trust increases. 
Finally, note that the inclusion of these four means and proportions relating to the 
potential trustees renders the coefficients on the trustors￿ sex and involvement in 
voluntary work insignificant. 
 
The fourth column of Table 6 contains the estimation of equation 7. The mean 
predicted trustworthiness of the potential trustees bears a significant coefficient with 
the wrong sign. This is likely to be a symptom of multicolinearity: mean predicted 
trustworthiness is highly correlated with each of the means and proportions relating to 
the trustees. Its inclusion leaves all other findings unchanged. 
 
 
4.  Conclusions 
 
The objective of the analysis presented above was to establish which trustees￿ 
characteristics trustors take into account when deciding whether and how much to 
trust and whether these characteristics are genuine signals of trustworthiness. Using 
experimental and survey data relating to Ghanaian manufacturing workers and  18
apprentices I conducted an analysis which took account of the possible effects of a 
wide range of trustees￿ characteristics. Thus, I discovered that male trustees, trustees 
with fewer children, and trustees who are more religiously and associationally active 
are trusted more. However, only one of these characteristics was found to have a 
corresponding effect on trustworthiness: trustees who are more religiously active are 
more trustworthy. Trustees with fewer children are more rather than less trusting and 
neither sex nor associational activity is associated with trustworthiness. The incorrect 
interpretation of information on trustees￿ number of children by trustors may indicate 
that they are wary of trustees with competing obligations: will they keep the money 
for themselves and their family or provide a return on the trusting act? That females 
are trusted less might be interpreted in the same way. That associational activity is 
inappropriately taken as a sign of trustworthiness suggests that trustors have 
misplaced faith in social capital theory. 
 
Indicators of trustworthiness that trustors do not appear to take into account include 
their trustees￿ recent experiences of illness, unemployment and being let down by 
friends. It may be that trustors do not have access to this sort of information: that such 
experiences impact negatively on trustworthiness would provide trustors with an 
incentive to find out about them, but would, at the same time, provide potential 
trustees with an incentive to keep them secret. Alternatively, trustors may know about 
these experiences and choose to discount them, seeing the placing of trust in the 
victims of such events as an opportunity to rebuild confidence in human nature. 
 
That trustors are unaware of or discount the fact that trustees who are indigenous to 
the area in which they live and work, involved in voluntary work, and full as opposed  19
to part time in the context in which they interact with the trustor, are more trustworthy 
is harder to explain. 
 
That no evidence of insider bias was found during the analysis suggests that within the 
context of study there is a fair degree of tolerance between individuals of different 
ethnicity, religion, and sex. 
 
Of course, these results may be subject to omitted variable bias and should be treated 
with some caution. This, along with the problems of multicolinearity described in 
section 4 above, are the primary shortcomings of this analytical approach. They derive 
from the reduction in experimenter control associated with shifting the focus of 
analysis from experimentally constructed and restricted information sets to naturally 
constructed and potentially unbounded information sets. The potential impact of these 
shortcomings on the conclusions we can draw from this analysis is difficult to 
quantify and, this being the case, it may be appropriate to view this approach as a 
complement to rather than a substitute for the more controlled approach taken in 
earlier studies. The best next step in the analysis of biases in trust might be to treat the 
findings of this investigation as hypotheses in a laboratory experiment involving 
experimentally constructed information sets that include data on some of the trustee 
characteristics that have been identified as important above.  20
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Table 1: Impact of trustees￿ characteristics on trustors￿ behaviour 
(a literature review) 






Sex women more ! Holm and Nystedt (2002)* e n Swedish citizens
women more ? Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2003)* e n Students, US
Age - ? Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2003)* e n Students, US
Income + ? Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2003)* e n Students, US
Religion same as trustor more ? Ferstman and Gneezy (2002) e tw Students, Belgium and Israel
religious more ? Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2003)* e n Students, US
Race/ethnicity black less x Burns (2004) e ph School children, South Africa
minorities less ! Eckel and Wilson (2003) e ph or tw Students, US
immigrants less ? Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2003)* e n Students, US
Eastern Jews less x Ferstman and Gneezy (2001) e tw Students, Israel
different from trustor less x Ferstman and Gneezy (2002) e tw Students, Belgium and Israel
different from trustor less ! Haile et al. (2004) e tw Students, South Africa
Social distance - ! Crosen and Buchan (1999) e tw Students, China, Korea, Tokyo, US
Phenotypic similarity similar more ? DeBruine (2002) e ph Students, US
Smiling + ? Scharleman et al. (2001) e ph Students, UK
e Behavioural measure experimental
n Behavioural measure non-experimental
! Trustees’ characteristic found to affect trustworthiness in same way
x Trustees’ characteristic found not to affect trustworthiness in same way
? No information on whether and how trustees’ characteristic affects trustworthiness
* In these studies the trustors were required to identify the type of playing partner they would prefer/trust.
ph Troustors presented with photos of trustees





Table 2: Determinants of trust and trustworthiness 





Trustors’ characteristics affecting trust 
Sex men more Chaundury and Gangadharan (2003) e Students, Australia
men less Eckel and Wilson (2003) e Students, US
Age - Fehr et al. (2003) e German citizens
inverse U Bellmare and Kroger (2003) e n Dutch citizens
Education + Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) n US citizens
+ Helliwell and Putnam (1999) n US citizens
inverse U Bellmare and Kroger (2003) e n Dutch citizens
Skills - Fehr et al. (2003) e German citizens
Household size - Fehr et al. (2003) e German citizens
Income + Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) n US citizens
Income inequality - Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) n US citizens
Religion Catholics more Fehr et al. (2003) e German citizens
hierarchical religions less La Porta et al. (1997) n Countries
Political affiliation socialists more Fehr et al. (2003) e German citizens
Race/ethnicity black less Ashraf et al. (2004) e n Students, Russia, South Africa, US
black less Burns (2004) e School children, South Africa
minorities less Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) n US citizens
immigrants more Fehr et al. (2003) e German citizens
Racial diversity - Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) n US citizens
+ Burns (2004) e School children, South Africa
Recent traumas - Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) n US citizens
Experience of generosity + Glaeser et al. e Students, US
Expectations + Ashraf et al. (2004) e n Students, Russia, South Africa, US
+ Barr (2003) e Villagers in Zimbabwe
+ Burns (2004) e School children, South Africa
Trustees’ characteristics affecting trustworthiness
Sex women more Bellmare and Kroger (2003) e n Dutch citizens
women more Chaundury and Gangadharan (2003) e Students, Australia
women more Crosen and Buchan (1999) e Students, China, Korea, Tokyo, US
Age - Bellmare and Kroger (2003) e n Dutch citizens
freshman rel to others less Glaeser et al. e Students, US
+ Fehr et al. (2003) e German citizens
Education - Bellmare and Kroger (2003) e n Dutch citizens
Health + Fehr et al. (2003) e German citizens
Employment + Fehr et al. (2003) e German citizens
Only children - Glaeser et al. e Students, US
Political affiliation no affiliation less Fehr et al. (2003) e German citizens
Race/ethnicity coloured less Burns (2004) e School children, South Africa
non-white Glaeser et al. e Students, US
minorities less Eckel and Wilson (2003) e Students, US
Racial diversity + Burns (2004) e School children, South Africa
Attractiveness - Eckel and Wilson (2003) e Students, US
e Behavioural measure experimental
n Behavioural measure non-experimental   25
Table 3: Players￿ characteristics 
Characteristic All Players First players Second players
Mean/Prop. Std. Dev. Mean/Prop. Std. Dev. Mean/Prop. Std. Dev.
female (dummy variable) 0.224 0.230 0.217
age (in years) 29.448 10.262 29.681 10.671 29.183 9.800
education (in years) 9.997 3.102 9.946 3.095 10.056 3.117
married (dummy variable) 0.362 0.358 0.367
children (number of) 1.148 1.766 1.147 1.701 1.150 1.841
total income 286.318 264.059 287.554 272.928 284.918 254.385
ln(total income) 5.362 0.782 5.359 0.781 5.365 0.785
years in workplace 5.349 5.943 5.796 6.680 4.842 4.950
part time (dummy variable) 0.120 0.127 0.111
unemployed ( in last 5 years, dummy variable) 0.094 0.078 0.111
illness (time off in past year, dummy variable) 0.388 0.397 0.378
Ethnicity
Asante (dummy variable) 0.367 0.402 0.328
Fante (dummy variable) 0.219 0.221 0.217
Other Akan (dummy variable) 0.138 0.123 0.156
Ga-Adangbe (dummy variable) 0.143 0.142 0.144
Ewe (dummy variable) 0.091 0.093 0.089
Northern (dummy variable) 0.042 0.020 0.067
Indigneous to area (dummy variable) 0.479 0.515 0.439
Kumasi (dummy variable) 0.505 0.520 0.489
Religion
Protestant (dummy variable) 0.372 0.387 0.356
Catholic (dummy variable) 0.115 0.098 0.133
Other Christian (dummy variable) 0.430 0.461 0.394
Muslim (dummy variable) 0.055 0.039 0.072
Other (dummy variable) 0.010 0.005 0.017
None (dummy variable) 0.018 0.010 0.028
relgious attendance (times per month) 14.852 30.307 12.992 25.255 16.960 35.122
associational  activity (hours per month) 2.924 5.608 2.976 5.757 2.866 5.449
voluntry work (hours per month) 0.831 2.372 0.845 2.651 0.816 2.016
let down by a friend (times in last year) 0.500 1.196 0.426 0.987 0.583 1.394
subjects (in session) 24.086 10.968 23.980 10.844 24.206 11.135
s j /y  (trust measure) (si/y for second players) 0.452 0.295 0.529 0.241
r i /s i  (trustworthiness measure) 1.490 0.570
Characteristics of potential trustees
Exp(r i/s i)j  1.482 0.164
Exp(R(X1i))j  1.496 0.101
proportion of females 0.235 0.302
mean age 29.163 4.705
mean education 10.056 1.542
proportion married 0.353 0.196
mean number of children 1.112 0.710
mean ln(total income) 5.384 0.420
mean years in work place 5.070 2.214
proprotion of part timers 0.121 0.246
mean religious attendance 15.407 10.935
mean associational activity 3.716 2.541
mean voluntary work 0.767 0.637
mean number of illnesses 0.358 0.184
proportion unemployed 0.105 0.089
mean let down by a friend 0.528 0.461
proportion who are indigenous 0.467 0.293
proportion with same ethnicity  0.481 0.293
proportion with same religion 0.384 0.212
proportion of same sex 0.828 0.828
Observations 384 204 180   26






























religious attendance 0.004 0.003
[0.002]* [0.001]*
voluntary work 0.055 0.044
[0.016]** [0.011]**











Robust standard errors in brackets
# significant at 10% level; * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level   27
 
Table 5: Trust,  y s j / , as a function of trustors￿ characteristics and  
potential trustees actual and predicted behaviour 
1234



























female -0.121 -0.110 -0.109 -0.111
[0.046]* [0.047]* [0.052]* [0.044]*
education 0.012 0.012 0.015 0.012
[0.006]* [0.004]* [0.006]* [0.005]*
ln(total income) 0.071 0.078 0.092 0.078
[0.029]* [0.020]** [0.026]** [0.020]**






Exp(r i/s i)j  0.019
[0.082]
Exp(R(X1i ))j  0.011
[0.075]
Constant 0.045 -0.046 -0.177 -0.054
[0.166] [0.118] [0.138] [0.130]
Observations 204 204 204 204
R-squared 0.147 0.109 0.148 0.110
Robust standard errors in brackets
# significant at 10% level; * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level   28
Table 6: Trust,  y s j / , as a function of potential trustees￿ characteristics 
1234
female -0.110 -0.091 -0.042 -0.039
[0.047]* [0.042]* [0.052] [0.051]
education 0.012 0.013 0.014 0.013
[0.004]* [0.007]
# [0.005]* [0.005]*
ln(total income) 0.078 0.105 0.092 0.094
[0.020]** [0.030]** [0.024]** [0.025]**
voluntary work -0.014 -0.016 -0.016 -0.016
[0.008]
# [0.010] [0.009] [0.009]
proprotion of part timers 0.120
[0.083]




mean let down by a friend 0.014
[0.048]
proportion who are indigenous -0.039
[0.098]
mean voluntary work 0.073
[0.021]**
mean number of children -0.069 -0.057 -0.046
[0.026]* [0.020]** [0.021]*










mean ln(total income) -0.141
[0.089]
proportion of females -0.187 -0.182 -0.204
[0.093]
# [0.079]* [0.083]*
mean associational activity 0.020 0.013 0.015
[0.007]** [0.005]* [0.005]**
proportion with same ethnicity  0.065
[0.078]
proportion with same religion 0.019
[0.105]
proportion of same sex -0.130
[0.106]
Exp (R(X1i))j  -0.204
[0.118]
#
constant -0.046 0.463 -0.131 0.147
[0.118] [0.317] [0.128] [0.197]
Observations 204 204 204 204
R-squared 0.109 0.181 0.153 0.157
Robust standard errors in brackets
# significant at 10% level; * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level
Trust
 